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Abstract—In the context of the Digital Business Ecosystems, 
small organizations cooperate between them in order to 
achieve common goals or offer new services for expanding 
their markets. There are different approaches for these coop-
eration models such as Virtual Enterprises, Virtual Organiza-
tions or Dynamic Electronic Institutions which in their life-
cycle have in common a dissolution phase. However this phase 
has not been studied deeply in the current literature and it 
lacks formalization. In this paper a first approach for achiev-
ing and managing the dissolution phase is proposed, as well as 
a CBR process in order to support it in a Multi-Agent System. 
 
Index Terms—Dissolution, Electronic Institutions, Digital 
Business Ecosystems. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Digital Business Ecosystem (DBE) is a digital self-
organizing collaborative environment populated by digital 
species that interact, express independent behaviour and 
evolve following laws of market selection [1]. The DBE 
concept is aimed at the adoption and development of the 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) by the 
Small and Medium size Enterprises (SMEs) providing them 
cost-effective technology and innovative uses of ICT. 
Within the DBE, the SMEs can interact with each other and 
enable them to combine their services, allowing them to ac-
cess to new market opportunities. 
This combination of services between SMEs, searching 
to expand their services and looking for fulfilling common 
objectives, can be viewed as a creation of an organization or 
an institution. There are different approaches of organiza-
tions in a digital environment such as Virtual Enterprises 
[2] or Electronic Institutions [3] (and Dynamic Electronic 
Institutions later on [4]) that can be found on the current 
literature, and regarding to their life-cycles, we can find 
some common issues. 
In the Virtual Enterprise approach from [2], there are 4 
phases defined for its life cycle: Creation, Operation, Evo-
lution and Dissolution. This last one can be reached by ei-
ther the successful achievement of all its goals or by the de-
cision of the involved partners to stop the operation of the 
Virtual Enterprise. 
The life cycle of the Dynamic Electronic Institutions is 
slightly different from the Virtual Enterprise’s as it is com-
posed by three phases, Formation, Foundation and Fulfil-
ment (Fig 2, named as the 3F life-cycle [5]). The last phase, 
the Fulfilment is reached when the institution should be dis-
solved, and can occur when the institution is no longer 
needed or when it’s no longer making profit. 
It seems logical to consider a dissolution phase for any 
approach related to any kind of organization or institution, 
either from real or virtual life. In the approaches previously 
mentioned, there is a dissolution phase in their life cycle, 
which however is overlooked without getting into deeper 
research on it [6, 7]. 
But the reason that this particular phase is not studied 
deeply enough, is not because it’s not an important phase; 
in economic terms, if an institution’s dissolution is not 
properly managed, it can generate tremendous costs [8]. 
There are several issues to be managed, like the corporate 
intellectual property, the distribution of the benefits and of 
course the identification of the moment when an institution 
has to dissolve itself. The fact is that the current work in the 
state of the art focuses on the formation/creation phase. 
The significance of the dissolution phase of any institu-
tion can be illustrated by taking the marriage institution as 
an example. In a marriage, if the dissolution phase (i.e. the 
divorce) is not properly managed and previously negotiated 
(e.g. the separation of marital property), the resulting costs 
can be huge. One real example, based on a Hollywood ce-
lebrity case, is the Michael Douglas’ two marriages. On the 
divorce of his first marriage, with Diandra Luker he had to 
pay over than 50 million dollars and a house in Mallorca. 
For his following marriage, with Catherine Zeta-Jones, he 
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Fig.1 Life Cycle of a Virtual Enterprise, from [2] 
 
Fig.2 Life Cycle of a Dynamic Electronic Institution, from [5] 
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negotiated an amount to pay for every eventual divorce 
cause, previous to the contract signature. He learned from 
past experience, and then he stated the dissolution condi-
tions and dissolution tasks before starting his new marriage. 
The contribution of this paper is making a first approach 
to the dissolution phase of the Dynamic Electronic Institu-
tions, identifying the activation of this phase and the tasks 
involved. In Section 2 we will refer to the relation between 
the DBE and Dynamic Electronic Institutions, and how 
norms can affect in them and in the dissolution phase. In 
section 3 we will take a real life normative environment to 
make it as our ground for the definition of the dissolution 
phase. In section 4 we will implement a simple example of 
agents making profits through dynamic institutions, and de-
fining the dissolution moment within a CBR approach. Fi-
nally in section 5 the conclusions and the future work are 
presented. 
II. ELECTRONIC INSTITUTIONS AND DBES 
Business Ecosystems represents an evolution of the con-
ception of the networked economy. We can consider local 
economies as communities of interacting and evolving or-
ganizations just like as natural ecosystems, where the spe-
cies compete, collaborate and evolve. The business organi-
zations are considered as an organism that can collaborate 
with others in order to create more complex structures. 
Joining together within networks, SMEs can offer com-
plex services and create new market opportunities, combin-
ing and sharing knowledge, products, services and infra-
structures (Fig. 3). 
The DBE is the enabling technology for the Business 
Ecosystems. It is a digital pervasive environment populated 
by digital components which evolves and adapts to local 
conditions. It’s not a piece of software or a business model, 
but a supporting business infrastructure offering and trans-
porting services and information to empower the whole 
business network [9]. 
We can consider a DBE as an open agent system where 
the components (agents) are not known a priori, and repre-
sent the different organizations participating in it. Organiza-
tions forming alliances, joining efforts and combining ser-
vices and products that allow them to fulfil objectives that 
in other way, couldn’t be possible to reach in an electronic 
environment, have been studied before within different ap-
proaches. 
Among the different types of networks, there is the Col-
laborative Network (CN) where different autonomous, het-
erogeneous entities form a network for achieving common 
goals. Virtual Enterprises (VE) are one of these CN, often 
described as a network of cooperating enterprises, that is, a 
group of pre-existing enterprises with some common goals 
that come together forming an interoperable network that 
acts as a single, temporary organization where the partners 
share skills and knowledge, have common goals and where 
the cooperation is peer to peer. Is a particular case of a Vir-
tual Organization, which isn’t limited to alliances between 
enterprises [11]. 
In the Virtual Enterprise literature, we can find refer-
ences about its life-cycle, which is composed by a crea-
tion/configuration, operation and a dissolution phases (Fig. 
1), and the need of supporting technological tools for each 
one of them, but for the case of the dissolution phase, there 
are not many references and even we can find the statement 
that is the less studied phase of its life-cycle [6]. 
Similar to the definition of the Virtual Organization, is 
the Electronic Institution. The institutions in the society de-
fine the way that we interact, represent the rules of the 
game, and establish laws, norms and rules for different 
situations or scenarios. 
The use of organizational metaphors to model agent sys-
tems suggests structuring agent societies with roles and re-
lationship between them. The first approach of an electronic 
institution can be found in [12], and the basic idea is a 
group of intelligent, autonomous and heterogeneous agents 
interacting between them under a set of norms in order to 
achieve individual and common goals. These norms, al-
though add constrains to the system, reduces its complexity 
making the agent’s behaviour more predictable. 
There are different European research groups working 
on similar subjects, each one with its particular vision and 
perspective to the problem [3, 13, 14, 15 and 16], however 
in [5] some problems and limitations of the electronic insti-
tutions in open agent systems were observed (the lack of a 
short-term electronic institution vision, the need of an auto-
matic design phase, how the entrance and exit of members 
affects the institution’s norms and objectives and how it can 
dissolve its components once the institution has fulfilled its 
objectives), which led to the development of Dynamic Elec-
tronic Institutions (Fig. 2). 
The current work related to the Dynamic Electronic In-
stitutions (DEI) is mainly focused on the first phases of its 
life-cycle. Once again, there is not a deeper approach on the 
dissolution, and we add a new problem related to the fulfil-
ment phase of the DEI in addition to the problem of how to 
dissolve its components: 
If a DEI hasn’t fulfilled all its objectives, should it be 
able to dissolve its components? When and why? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.3 Example of a Business Ecosystem taken from [10] 
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III. FIRST APPROACH OF THE DISSOLUTION OF A DEI 
If something works in the social reality, it’s not foolish 
to think that it could work in a system that is based on so-
cial relationships like the DEIs. To define the dissolution 
phase of a DEI in a business environment as the DBEs, a 
good place to look is the Commercial Law. In particular, we 
will look on the extinction of the Limited Companies. 
In the aspect of the dissolution, commercial law is very 
similar within the different countries in the European Un-
ion1, and they identify two phases before the extinction of a 
society: The dissolution process and then the liquidation 
process [17]. 
The dissolution process identifies when a company can 
be dissolved and then proceed to the liquidation process. 
There are several causes identified in the law and we can 
separate them in two groups, the ones that automatically 
drive to the liquidation process (we will call them decisive 
causes), and the ones that allow to take measures to avoid 
the liquidation process and require an agreement between 
the different members of the company’s general board (we 
will call these causes conditioning causes) in which is the 
fulfilment of all the objectives among other causes. 
After the dissolution process has finished, the liquidation 
process starts. Here the roles of the company change and 
some of the members (usually the administrators) take the 
role of liquidators. First, the company has to close their 
pendent commitments, and then the liquidators basically 
have to take inventory and elaborate a wealth balance of the 
company which has to be approved by the company’s gen-
eral board. After that, a liquidation share is paid to each 
member of the company, based on the participation of each 
one of them (unless in their statutes is specified something 
else). 
The companies have, under the law, a local set of rules 
and norms: their statutes. These statutes can determine dis-
solution causes added to the ones specified by the law, and 
can change some values in the liquidation process like the 
distribution of the earnings (or debts). 
The Electronic Institutions provide a normative system 
of reference under which agents reach cooperation agree-
ments. This cooperation agreement implies that the agents 
are subject to a set of norms that regulate and support inter-
actions taking place within the Electronic Institution [18]. 
In the DEI context, we can consider this normative envi-
ronment as analogous to the real world company’s statutes, 
which are included in the institutional contract the partners 
agreed during the acceptance step of the DEI [5]. 
Also, the identification of the different dissolution causes 
depends on the performance of the institution. Some causes 
depend on the activity (or lack of) of the institution, so there 
should be a monitoring mechanism supporting the institu-
tion. For the DEI’s performance monitoring, contextualized 
norms defined for each agent commitment inside the institu-
tion is suggested in [19]. This monitoring allows maintain-
ing internal trust levels or the creation of performance cases 
for future references that will support the dissolution phase. 
 
1 We will use the Spanish commercial law as reference 
Inspired by the normative framework proposed in [18], 
we identify three normative levels (Fig. 4). 
Institutional norms refers to the norms inside the whole 
environment where institutions are formed and dissolved, is 
the law which regulates the behaviour of every agent, con-
tains the common norms for the whole system and default 
templates for cooperation agreements. These norms are con-
tained in the DBE. 
Constitutional norms are created when a cooperation 
agreement is reached before the creation of the DEI. Can 
define additional dissolution causes, and describes the con-
stitution of the DEI, when the DEI is modified (like in a re-
foundation situation, the entrance of a new partner, the 
modification of its objectives), these norms are changed 
too. We can relate it to the companies’ statutes. 
Operational norms are created for every task inside the 
institution. Every commitment for any action should have a 
related operational norm; this will help for monitoring the 
performance of the DEI. 
These norms will help for supporting the dissolution 
phase where, based on the contract law, we can identify two 
processes: The activation and the liquidation. 
The activation process is when the DEI identifies a situa-
tion that could be a dissolution cause. Then, depending on 
the activation cause (if it is decisive or if it is conditioning), 
the DEI has to decide if it wants to proceed to the liquida-
tion or if it decides to modify itself in order to continue op-
erating. 
During the liquidation process we identify 5 liquidation 
tasks, inspired by the commercial law’s liquidation tasks: 
1. Proceed: The DEI has to decide if it wants to go on 
to the liquidation process or instead, modify its 
structure within a re-foundation process to avoid its 
extinction. 
2. Calculate: Make an overall balance of the DEI’s 
wealth, identify the pending tasks and their priority. 
3. Allocation and Execution: If there are mandatory 
tasks identified, assign and execute them. 
4. Collect: Retrieve pending transactions with external 
organizations in case that the Institution has inter-
acted with others. This will allow making the final 
balance of the institution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4 Normative levels in the DBE and the DEI 
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5. Share out: The distribution of the earnings or debts, 
based on the partners’ contribution in the company, 
or by the contract specification [5]. Before the distri-
bution, there must be an agreement between the part-
ners about how the earnings will be distributed. If 
there is no agreement, a new balance should be 
made. 
The formalization of the DEIs (from [5]) suggests a pre-
vious case knowledge approach (e.g. Case Based reasoning, 
CBR) for the automation of the formation of new DEIs [7], 
this min that for supporting the CBR, there must be a 
knowledge base about previous institutions, which is cre-
ated when each DEI is dissolved. So, finally after the liqui-
dation process has finished, a common knowledge base 
should be updated within a report of the institution ele-
ments. 
We suggest that the knowledge base could be also used 
for supporting the dissolution process to automate cause’s 
identification like the potential inability for fulfilling the 
objectives in the actual conditions. For this purpose, the re-
port should include several evaluation reports related to the 
performance of the institution in different times [20] during 
the operation of the DEI. This will help to identify future 
cases and to predict measures to take or if the institution 
shouldn’t continue operating. This report, in its simplest 
form, should include the time that have been made, the ex-
pected level of fulfilment of the tasks at that time, and the 
actual real level of fulfilment of these. 
IV. AN AUTOMATED DISSOLUTION APPROACH 
For this work, we implemented a digital environment 
where agents in a space forms consecutive coalitions (as we 
wanted to focus only in the dissolution, the coalition forma-
tion process is done automatically having no intelligence 
there) with a fixed operation time (in time steps). 
The mechanism is simple. Agents move and interact a-
synchronously through a grid space (which represents the 
ecosystem), and when they find another agent in their 
neighbourhood (nearer than two cells), they send a message 
proposing the creation of a coalition. In the next time step, 
proposed agents answer if they accept or not. Every agent in 
the system offer a single (not unique) service, the advantage 
of forming a coalition is that two agents together can offer 
their own service plus their combination, expanding their 
markets. 
The idea is to demonstrate the utility of supporting tools 
to automate the dissolution causes identification, and the 
need of a transitional step between the activation and the 
liquidation for deciding if to proceed or not. We will use a 
previous case knowledge approach to identify when the 
agents expectations probably will not be fulfilled. 
The dissolution causes we are going to focus in are the 
deadline fulfilment (when the expected lifespan is reached) 
and the inability (that identifies when is not convenient to 
continue operating as the earning expectations cannot be 
fulfilled). 
For the simulation, we made the following hypotheses 
related to the agents: 
1. Each agent offers a single service. 
2. Agents who coalesce are more probable to get bene-
fits. To the extreme that, for this case, single agents 
get no benefits (1 bis). 
3. When agents coalesce, there are three options re-
lated to the coalition lifespan: a) set a fixed lifespan, 
b) do not fix a lifespan and c) set an initial lifespan 
which can be changed. 
4. In the specific negotiation scenario, at least two 
agents coalesce; a tender and one or more tenderees. 
As for the calculated benefits and coalition services, we 
assume that: 
1. Two or more agents offering the same service can’t 
be part of the same coalition. 
2. The benefits are calculated based on the services a 
coalition offer and the demand they have. 
3. The coalitions will offer the individual services of 
each member agent, as well the combination of these 
services. For example, if a coalition is composed by 
two agents, which respectively offer the services A 
and B, the coalition will offer the services A, B and 
A+B (Fig. 6) 
4. Every service has the same base demand, as well the 
combined services. 
5. The demand of a service depends of the competition 
that this service offering has (how many coalitions 
offer the same service). For example, if a coalition 
offers the services A, B and A+B, and another active 
coalition offers the services A, C and A+C, there 
will be two competitors for the service A. 
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Earnings for each time step are calculated by the follow-
ing equation (1): 
 
∑ +=
i
i NCBE )/(              (1) 
 
Where: 
E is the total earning of the coalition. 
B is the base earning for each service i. 
C is the number of coalitions that offer the same service i 
(including the coalition that the earnings are being calcu-
lated). 
N is a random number from a normal distribution with 
average 0 and variance (B/2). 
This implies that a coalition with greater diversity in the 
services it offers will have lesser competition. 
We mentioned before that for supporting the dissolution, 
we will use a previous cases knowledge method. In our first 
approach we will use Case Based Reasoning (CBR, which 
from now on we will refer as the algorithm) to identify 
cases when it’s better to dissolve the coalition as the earn-
ing expectations cannot be fulfilled, or when the coalition’s 
lifespan is about to reach its end, identify if it’s better to ex-
tend it instead of proceeding to the liquidation. 
During the operation of the coalition, it will create 
evaluation cases to retain them in the knowledge base. The 
evaluation cases, for the sake of simplicity, will contain 
only the earned money from the last evaluation, the diver-
sity of the offered services and the time steps passed from 
the last evaluation. There will be three evaluation moments; 
one at the beginning, other at the middle and a last one just 
before the coalition’s deadline. If the deadline is extended, 
there will be added new evaluation cases. 
The algorithm, in his retrieving step, will identify pairs 
of consecutive evaluations similar to the current and past 
evaluations. Once a similar case is found, the algorithm will 
try to predict the following state based on the past cases and 
evaluate, reusing the past similar cases, which is the best 
action to do for the coalition: if is better to continue operat-
ing extending its lifespan or dissolve. 
The similitude for the CBR is calculated by (2): 
 
)**()**( 211121 wEarwDivwEarwDivSim kkkk −− +++=  (2) 
 
Where: 
Div is the diversity similitude at a time k and a time k-1. 
Ear is the earnings similitude per time step at a time k 
and a time k-1. 
wn are the respective weights for the similitude values. 
In the knowledge base there must be an evaluation at a 
time k+1 in order to estimate the earnings. 
The minimum and maximum earning expectations 
(expmin and expmax) for each agent in the coalition are (3): 
 
2/exp
5/exp
max
min
B
B
=
=                 (3) 
 
B is the base earning for a service, from equation (1). 
To identify positive cases from the negative ones, the al-
gorithm will compare the earning expectations with the 
benefits founded in the similar cases from the knowledge 
base, reusing them. 
The simulation environment has been developed in Re-
Past2, and the tests were done in a grid of 50x50 cells, with 
500 different agents that can offer one of the 10 different 
services. The base earning for each service was fixed in 1, 
and the default duration time of a coalition was 15 time 
steps. We tested it during 10.000 time steps in three differ-
ent scenarios: 
Experiment 1: When the coalitions start with a defined 
lifespan, which it can be extended or reduced, supported by 
the algorithm. 
Experiment 2: When the coalitions have an unlimited 
lifespan, so new coalitions can never be dissolved (this be-
cause as agents only get earnings when are in coalition - 
from hypothesis 2bis-, to compare this experiment with the 
others that have agents without coalitions wandering in the 
grid more often). 
Experiment 3: When the coalitions have a fixed lifespan 
which cannot be modified. 
After ten runs of 10.000 steps for each experiment, the 
results on the average earning at each step can be seen on 
Fig. 8. After the step 8.600 the earnings per step seem to 
stabilize, so for the results we will consider for the average 
benefits are from the step 8.600 onward. 
The average total earnings are: 
 
 Average Std Deviation 
Experiment 1 1.530,04 12,69 
 
2 http://repast.sourceforge.net 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6 Addition of services in the simulation 
 
Fig.7 Agents moving in the space in the simulation 
SME 
Service A 
Service B 
SME 
Coalition 
Service A 
Service B 
Service A+B 
2008 Second IEEE International Conference on Digital Ecosystems and Technologies (IEEE DEST 2008)
© 2008 IEEE.
113
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITAT DE GIRONA. Downloaded on May 8, 2009 at 07:14 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
 
 
 
Experiment 2 997,21 13,35 
Experiment 3 543,77 16,26 
 
As we can observe, there is a significant improvement 
when the algorithm supports the identification of the disso-
lution time of the coalition (experiment 1). In the experi-
ment 2 there aren’t many agents out of a coalition, and in 
consequence not earning money, but this doesn’t guarantee 
that they are in the best possible coalition, or maybe they 
are better searching for new ones without making benefits 
instead being part of a bad performing one. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We made a first approach on the dissolution phase of the 
DEIs that can be extended to other types of collaborative 
networks. In this approach we identified two processes: the 
activation of the dissolution and the liquidation of the insti-
tution. 
The activation is determined by different causes, but this 
activation doesn’t mean necessarily that the institution must 
continue to the liquidation. Depending on the activation 
cause, the institution can modify itself (evolve in the Virtual 
Enterprise approach from [2] or enter in a re-foundation in 
the DEI approach from [5]) for continuing its operations 
and exiting from the dissolution phase. 
In our first approach we presented the deadline fulfilment 
and the inability dissolution causes, supported by a CBR for 
its automation, reusing the knowledge base used for the in-
stitution formation. These causes depend on the norms 
adopted by the institution previous its formation, as in there 
are specified the expected lifespan of the institution and the 
expected earnings. 
The negotiation process in the current model is made 
automatically, but is expected to be added more complexity 
into it, like dissolution issues among the negotiation ele-
ments. This is expected to be implemented in the context of 
the project ONE [21]. 
The next step is to focus on the liquidation process, how 
it can be driven, how the norms affect it, what has to be ne-
gotiated and what has to be considered for this task during 
the negotiation. Also a full formalization of the dissolution 
phase and its norms is expected. 
Business situations are complex and aren’t easy to simu-
late, that’s why these results are considered as preliminary. 
At the time, we oversimplified the model for focusing our 
study only in the dissolution activation causes mentioned 
before. 
At this time this topic hasn’t been studied in deep, and 
the future related work offers a wide open field of research 
that needs to be explored for the study of the Electronic In-
stitutions. 
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